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Congruency sequence effects (CSEs) refer to the observation that congruency effects in
conﬂict tasks are typically smaller following incongruent compared to following congruent
trials. This measure has long been thought to provide a unique window into top-down
attentional adjustments and their underlying brainmechanisms. According to the renowned
conﬂict monitoring theory, CSEs reﬂect enhanced selective attention following conﬂict
detection. Still, alternative accounts suggested that bottom-up associative learning sufﬁces
to explain the pattern of reaction times and error rates. A couple of years ago, a review
by Egner (2007) pitted these two rivalry accounts against each other, concluding that both
conﬂict adaptation and feature integration contribute to the CSE. Since then, a wealth of
studies has further debated this issue, and two additional accounts have been proposed,
offering intriguing alternative explanations. Contingency learning accounts put forward
that predictive relationships between stimuli and responses drive the CSE, whereas
the repetition expectancy hypothesis suggests that top-down, expectancy-driven control
adjustments affect the CSE. In the present paper, we build further on the previous review
(Egner, 2007) by summarizing and integrating recent behavioral and neurophysiological
studies on the CSE. In doing so, we evaluate the relative contribution and theoretical value
of the different attentional and memory-based accounts. Moreover, we review how all of
these inﬂuences can be experimentally isolated, and discuss designs and procedures that
can critically judge between them.
Keywords: cognitive control, congruency sequence effect, contingency learning, feature integration, conflict
adaptation, repetition expectancy
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, the study of cognitive control – the ﬂex-
ible and adaptive regulation of our behavior – has increasingly
drawn the attention of psychologists and neuroscientists alike.
One critical aspect of this ability concerns the continuous mon-
itoring of our behavior for situations in which missteps become
more likely, allowing us to adjust behavior and prevent (further)
deviation from goal-directed performance (i.e., conﬂict adapta-
tion). The seminal congruency sequence effect (CSE) is considered
a hallmark phenomenon of such cognitive control (Botvinick
et al., 2001; see also Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009). However,
despite its central position in this research domain, the interpreta-
tion of the CSE is far from unequivocal, and alternative accounts
highlighted the role of episodic memory (Hommel et al., 2004;
Schmidt, 2013) or subjects’ explicit expectations (Gratton et al.,
1992). Given the wealth of behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc stud-
ies relying on the CSE to further our insight in cognitive control,
both in basic research and in more applied and clinical contexts,
it seems of cardinal importance to recognize and dissociate these
alternative views. Here, we give an overview of the studies that
tested these accounts before we provide guidelines for further
research.
The studies reviewed in the present paper investigated the CSE
in typical conﬂict tasks such as the Stroop (Stroop, 1935), Erik-
sen ﬂanker (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), and Simon (Simon, 1969)
task. In these tasks, participants are asked to respond to a rele-
vant stimulus feature (e.g., color), and the congruency between an
irrelevant stimulus feature and either this relevant stimulus fea-
ture or the response is varied. The extent to which the irrelevant
dimension is able to capture attention and inﬂuence performance
is reﬂected in the size of the congruency effect – the difference
between incongruent (I) and congruent (C) trials. This difference
is typically strongly reduced when the previous trial was incongru-
ent compared to when it was congruent – the CSE. In this review,
we ﬁrst elaborate on the standard interpretation of this CSE in
terms of conﬂict adaptation and its underlying neural signature.
Building further on a previous review by Egner (2007), we then
set out to evaluate three alternative hypotheses for the conﬂict-
monitoring theory: feature integration, contingency learning, and
repetition expectancy. For each of these accounts, we highlight
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence and discuss experi-
mental procedures that can critically isolate their inﬂuence on the
CSE. In the ﬁnal section, we summarize the relative contribution
of conﬂict adaptation, feature integration, contingency learning,
and expectancy, and put forward some outstanding questions for
further research.
CONFLICT ADAPTATION
The CSE has been a major inspiration to the conﬂict-monitoring
theory of Botvinick et al. (2001), which boosted and dominated
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research in the ﬁeld of cognitive control over the last decade.
Within this framework, it is assumed that ﬂuctuations in the size
of the congruency effect provide a direct window into online
adjustments in cognitive control. The theory posits that the
information processing stream is continuously monitored for the
occurrence of conﬂict. Contingent upon the detection of con-
ﬂict by the monitoring system, control is up-regulated. Following
low conﬂict on congruent trials, control is temporarily down-
regulated, and stronger interference effects on subsequent trials
are predicted.
The CSE has proven to be a very robust and generalizable effect.
Following its initial report in the context of an Eriksen ﬂanker
task (Gratton et al., 1992), it was replicated in a wide variety of
tasks, including the color–word (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004), numeri-
cal (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011), and gender face-word Stroop
(e.g.,Egner et al., 2008), the social (e.g., Kunde et al., 2012) and spa-
tial Simon (e.g., Stürmer et al., 2002), the parity judgment (e.g., the
spatial–numerical association of response codes or SNARC effect;
Pﬁster et al., 2013), the picture–word interference (e.g., Duthoo
et al., in revision), the perceptual ﬂuency (e.g., Dreisbach and
Fischer, 2011), the prime-target (e.g., Kunde and Wühr, 2006),
and affective priming task (e.g., Frings and Wentura, 2008). Also
in studies on arithmetics, difﬁculty arising from inappropriate
strategy execution is susceptible to sequential, trial-to-trial perfor-
mance adjustments (e.g., Uittenhove and Lemaire, 2012; Lemaire
and Hinault, 2013). Notwithstanding the diversity of these exper-
imental paradigms, the sequential effects are typically interpreted
in terms of increased cognitive control following the detection of
conﬂict.
The conﬂict-monitoring theory’s broad appeal can partly be
attributed to the clear predictions it makes concerning the under-
lying brain mechanism involved in different cognitive control
operations. According to Botvinick et al. (2001), the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) is speciﬁcally involved in the detection of
conﬂict (Jones et al., 2002), whereas subsequent control adjust-
ments are implemented by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC; Egner and Hirsch, 2005a). The CSE lends itself well to
tease apart these brain regions, by comparing the neural response
to incongruent trials dependent on whether the preceding trial
was congruent or incongruent: the former trial transitions are
supposed to evoke a strong conﬂict detection signal, whereas the
latter trial transitions are associated with strong conﬂict resolu-
tion. fMRI investigations of the CSE in both the Stroop (Kerns
et al., 2004) and Simon task (Kerns, 2006) convincingly showed
that conﬂict-evoked ACC activity predicted subsequent behav-
ioral adaptations, which were, in turn, accompanied by stronger
DLPFC activity. In a follow-up study, Egner and Hirsch (2005b)
elegantly showed that these behavioral adjustments are presum-
ably brought about through cortical ampliﬁcation of task-relevant
information.
Other neurophysiological studies generally conﬁrm the predic-
tions of the conﬂict-monitoring theory. A series of EEG studies
has uncovered deﬂections in event-related potentials that read-
ily map onto the behavioral pattern of the CSE (for a recent
review, see Larson et al., 2014). In a ﬂanker task, sequential
modulations of the ACC-mediated N2 component have been
shown to covary with conﬂict adaptation effects in reaction times
and error rates (Clayson and Larson, 2011, 2012; Forster et al.,
2011; Larson et al., 2012). Similarly, the conﬂict slow potential
elicited by incongruent Stroop trials is strongly reduced if the
previous trial was incongruent compared to when it was con-
gruent (Larson et al., 2009; Donohue et al., 2012). In the Simon
task, Stürmer et al. (2002) showed smaller lateralized readiness
potentials (LRPs) over the motor cortex following incongruent
trials, indicating a reduced impact of the irrelevant dimension on
response execution. In a follow-up repetitive transcranialmagnetic
stimulation (rTMS) study, Stürmer et al. (2007) demonstrated
that the CSE was effectively abolished following TMS stimula-
tion over the left DLPFC. Finally, Sheth et al. (2012) combined
fMRI and human single neuron recording to show that modu-
lation of the dorsal ACC by the previous trial predicts behavioral
adaptation (i.e., a CSE). Moreover, these conﬂict adjustments were
completely abolished following surgically targeted ablation of the
dACC.
FEATURE INTEGRATION
Despite being the dominant interpretation of the CSE, the con-
ﬂict monitoring hypothesis has been challenged by alternative
accounts in terms of episodic memory effects deriving from
stimulus-response events, excluding a role for higher-level cogni-
tive control processes. In essence, the feature integration account
argues that the pattern of sequential modulation is problemat-
ically confounded with low-level repetition effects. Mayr et al.
(2003), for example, pointed out that in a standard two-value
arrow ﬂanker task, exact stimulus repetitions will evoke priming
effects that mimic the CSE. When they excluded these stimulus
repetitions from the analyses, the CSE vanished. Hommel et al.
(2004) took this idea one step further, by showing that not only
complete, but also partial stimulus feature repetitions inﬂuence
performance, again mimicking a CSE. Brieﬂy, the feature inte-
gration account assumes that stimulus and response features of a
current trial will be temporarily bound together into a common
episodic memory representation. Activation of any of these fea-
tures on the next trial will automatically co-activate the remaining
features. Therefore, complete stimulus repetitions and complete
stimulus alternations evoke faster responses, since no previous
feature binding has to be undone. Critically, in a typical Simon
or ﬂanker task, comprising of four unique stimuli, sequential con-
gruency, and feature integration are perfectly confounded: CC and
II trial transitions entail complete stimulus repetitions or alterna-
tions, whereas CI and IC trial transitions always consist of partial
stimulus repetitions.
In the wake of the feature integration account, extensive
research efforts were dedicated to unraveling the relative contri-
bution of higher-level attentional control and lower-level episodic
memory effects to the CSE. A widely applied approach was to
simply expand the stimulus set of a given congruency task and
restrict the analysis to a subset of trials in which feature overlap
was absent or kept equal. Still, studies that followed this logic
drew some remarkably inconsistent conclusions. Even though
the CSE was found to be completely abolished following post
hoc exclusion of feature repetitions in some studies (Chen and
Melara, 2009; Experiment 1 of Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2006; Fernandez-Duque and Knight, 2008), other studies
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reported a remaining CSE for transitions with equal feature over-
lap (Wühr, 2005) or devoid of any feature overlap (Kerns et al.,
2004; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Kunde and Wühr, 2006). Notebaert
and Verguts (2006), Akçay and Hazeltine (2007, 2011) and Bugg
(2008) further removed negative priming trial transitions from
the analysis (e.g., sequences where the irrelevant, to-be-ignored
stimulus information of the previous trial becomes the relevant
stimulus information on the next), and conﬁrmed a contribution
of attentional control to the CSE. Still, this experimental strat-
egy is somewhat problematic: by excluding more and more trial
transitions, the decision on the presence or absence of a CSE is
made on an increasingly small and thus special subset of the data.
In an attempt to circumvent this problem, Notebaert and Verguts
(2007)proposed amultiple regression approach to statistically sep-
arate the inﬂuence of bottom-up feature repetitions and top-down
control (see also Braem et al., 2012; Kunde et al., 2012). Another
solution is to preclude trial transitions that are contaminated with
feature integration a priori. Duthoo and Notebaert (2012) devised
such eight-color vocal Stroop task devoid of any feature over-
lap and still found evidence for the CSE. Puccioni and Vallesi
(2012; Experiment 1) ran a similar manual four-choice Stroop
task. Again, a remaining CSE was found, yet only in the accuracy
data.
However, both accounts are not mutually exclusive: The fact
that a CSE is still found in the absence of feature repetitions does
not imply that the feature integration account should be discarded
(cf., Egner, 2007). Notebaert et al. (2006) elegantly demonstrated
the additive contribution of both sources in a three-color manual
Stroop task. By varying the response-to-stimulus interval (RSI),
these authors were also able to show that bottom-up priming
effects are evident at very short RSIs (i.e., 50 ms), whereas top-
down, conﬂict-induced processes required more time to inﬂuence
behavior (i.e., 200 ms). Given these insights, one can, however,
wonder whether the neurophysiological evidence reviewed above
is able to separate both contributions. Even though none of these
studies were set up to test the predictions of the feature integra-
tion account, they did control for such effects in the analyses. Yet,
as discussed by Egner (2007), predictions of the feature integra-
tion and conﬂict adaptation account crucially differ with respect
to II sequences: whereas feature integration would predict these
transitions to be associated with facilitation, being complete rep-
etitions or alternations, conﬂict adaptation links these transitions
with enhanced conﬂict resolution and controlled processing. The
strong DLPFC activation in response to such transitions clearly
favors the conﬂict adaptation hypothesis. Moreover, feature inte-
gration has no straightforward explanation as to why the CSE
completely vanishes following TMS over the DLPFC (Stürmer
et al., 2007) or surgical removal of the dACC (Sheth et al., 2012).
As such, the feature integration account does not easily accommo-
date the interactions between ACC and DLPFC that lie at the core
of the conﬂict-monitoring theory.
CONTINGENCY LEARNING
Even though controlling for feature integration effects (be it
post hoc or a priori) has become common practice in experi-
ments on the CSE, this design choice actually comes at a price.
Since most researchers decide to expand the stimulus set of their
conﬂict tasks while at the same time maintaining a 50% con-
gruent/incongruent ratio, they artiﬁcially increase the amount of
congruent trials that would result from a random feature selec-
tion. Congruent trials would indeed occur less often, if stimulus
features are selected randomly (e.g., 25% in a four-choice con-
gruency task). As Mordkoff (2012) has argued, increasing the
proportion of congruent trials forces irrelevant stimulus dimen-
sions to become informative. In a Stroop task, for example, each
(irrelevant) color word would then be more often paired with
its congruent color than with any of the other colors. This asso-
ciation between a stimulus dimension and response is termed a
contingency. Over time, such contingencies will render the stim-
ulus dimension increasingly predictive of the correct response.
Increasing the amount of congruent trials in a Stroop task would,
for example, strengthen the association between the word “RED”
and the corresponding response “red.” It has already been shown
that participants are able to pick up and exploit such contingencies
(see e.g., Dishon-Berkovits and Algom, 2000; Melara and Algom,
2003). This idea was elaborated upon in the work of Schmidt
and Besner (2008) and Schmidt (2013), who claimed that con-
tingency biases can artiﬁcially elevate the size of the CSE. More
speciﬁcally, Schmidt et al. (2007) showed that high-contingency
trials (i.e., predictive of the correct response) are responded to
more rapidly and accurately than low-contingency trials, and that
the difference between the two (i.e., the contingency effect) is
larger following high-contingency trials compared to following
low-contingency trials. In contingency-biased congruency tasks,
congruent trials are high-contingency, so that the congruency
sequence effect is perfectly confounded with the contingency
sequence effect.
To illustrate the impact of these confounding contingency
biases,Mordkoff (2012) compared performance on a contingency-
unbiased (i.e., 25% congruent trials) and a contingency-biased
(i.e., 50% congruent trials) four-choice Simon task. After remov-
ing all trial transitions involving feature repetitions, only the
contingency-biased Simon task revealed a clear pattern of sequen-
tial modulation. Strikingly, there was no sign of a CSE in the
contingency-unbiased task. In similar vein, Schmidt and De
Houwer (2011) observed no remaining CSE in a Stroop task
where all contingencies were kept equal. These observations led
Schmidt (2013) to claim that conﬂict adaptation may simply be an
illusion, and that the brain-behavior correlations that have been
interpreted in support of the conﬂict-monitoring theory actually
reﬂect the memory biases that alternative theories have put for-
ward. ACC activity, for example, might then reﬂect contingency
learning rather than conﬂict detection. Alternatively, Grinband
et al. (2011) argued that the ACC is sensitive to time-on-task, irre-
spective of conﬂict. As such, every effect present in RTs (including
the CSE) will correlate with ACC activity (cf., Schmidt, 2013).
Even though there is no simple way of judging between these
competing views on the basis of existing neurophysiological evi-
dence, the lack of a behavioral effect in contingency-unbiased tasks
poses a considerable challenge for a conﬂict adaptation account of
the CSE.
As a critical test for conﬂict adaptation, Duthoo et al. (in revi-
sion) constructed versions of three common conﬂict tasks that
controlled for both feature integration and contingency confounds
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a priori. To this end, a vocal six-color Stroop task was designed in
which color and word never repeated across two consecutive trials
and each word was equally often paired with its congruent color
as with one of the ﬁve remaining incongruent colors. In this way,
color–word contingencies were equated between congruent and
incongruent trials, while the ratio of congruent/incongruent tri-
als was kept at 50%. In similar vein, a six-letter manual ﬂanker
task was constructed. Finally, as to further minimize the contribu-
tion of memory biases, a picture–word interference task with 120
unique congruent and incongruent picture–word combinations
was administered. Interestingly, a robustCSEwas found in all three
paradigms, notwithstanding the differences in response modality
and conﬂict type. Moreover, this result was recently replicated
in a similarly optimized four-choice ﬂanker task (Hengstler et al.,
2014). In order to account for the discrepancy with the ﬁndings
of Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) and Mordkoff (2012), Duthoo
et al. (in revision) point out that the introduction of a proportion
congruent manipulation in contingency-unbiased designs (i.e.,
75% incongruent trials) might have induced a sustained control
state that potentially obscured the more transient control adjust-
ments reﬂected in the CSE. Second, they argued that precluding
memory biases by design might be crucial to observe“pure”cogni-
tive control effects. This relates to the idea that conﬂict adaptation
might be seen as a “last resort” which participants fall back on
when simply relying on the environment (e.g., stimulus-response
associations) is insufﬁcient (Bugg, 2014).
Corroborating evidence comes from other recent studies show-
ing signiﬁcant sequential modulation in the absence of both
stimulus/response repetitions and contingency learning. Kim and
Cho (2014) let participants alternate between two color-ﬂanker
tasks. In one task, participants responded to vertically aligned
red or yellow circles with two ﬁngers, whereas in the other
task they responded to horizontally aligned blue or green circles
with two different ﬁngers. As such, each trial transition never
involved a response or stimulus repetition, and random selec-
tion of stimulus features produced a 50% congruent/incongruent
ratio. When both response sets were assigned to one single hand
(leading participants to process the two tasks as a single response
mode), a signiﬁcant CSE was obtained. In a similar vein, Schmidt
and Weissman (2014) created a prime-target paradigm in which
horizontally aligned stimuli (“<” or “>”) alternated with ver-
tically aligned stimuli (“∧” or “v”). To rule out contingency
confounds, four unique incongruent stimulus-distractor pair-
ings were selected (i.e., “< >,” “> <,” “∧ v,” and “v ∧”). Even
though the task comprised of different stimulus sets (horizontal
vs. vertical) and response sets (left vs. right hand), Schmidt and
Weissman (2014) found sequential modulation. Moreover, they
replicated these ﬁndings in an identical task in which arrows were
replaced with words (e.g., “up” or “left”). Weissman et al. (2014)
found very similar results in an online replication study, as well
as in an analogous contingency-unbiased Simon and temporal
ﬂanker task.
Finally, Freitas and Clark (2014) similarly restricted their anal-
ysis to transitions involving a shift in the vertical/horizontal
dimension of their newly designed “Stroop-trajectory” paradigm,
thereby excluding stimulus and response repetitions without
introducing contingency confounds. On each trial, a series of
identical, slightly overlapping pointing black triangles were pre-
sented one at the time in fast succession. Lastly, a smaller gray
triangle pointing in the same direction was presented at either the
top or bottom of the vertically aligned arrays, or at the left or
right of the horizontally aligned arrays. Participants were asked
to indicate the location of the smaller gray triangle, which either
matched (congruent trials) or mismatched (incongruent trials)
the direction in which the triangles were pointing. According to
the authors, the gradual trial build-up in the task discouraged
both negative priming and feature integration effects. Again, the
authors reported strong sequential modulation. Taken together,
the designs of Duthoo et al. (in revision), Freitas and Clark (2014),
Kim and Cho (2014), Schmidt and Weissman (2014) and Weiss-
man et al. (2014) suggest that a robust CSE can still be found,
even when all known memory and learning confounds have been
controlled for.
REPETITION EXPECTANCY
In his review, Egner (2007) pointed out that the role of par-
ticipants’ expectations has remained a strikingly underexplored
factor potentially contributing to the CSE. Interestingly, in the
original description of the CSE, Gratton et al. (1992) explained
their ﬁndings in terms of strategic attentional adjustments driven
by participants’ subjective expectations regarding the nature of
the upcoming trial. Their repetition expectancy account assumed
that participants were biased to expect repeating stimulus condi-
tions over successive trials, regardless of the objective probability
of these conditions to occur (Remington, 1969). Such repeti-
tion bias leads participants to expect that the trial following a
congruent trial will be congruent, and the trial following an incon-
gruent trial will be incongruent. Gratton et al. (1992) further
theorized that such (passive) expectancies fed into (pro)active
preparations that are not different from a situation in which
congruency is explicitly cued: in anticipation of an incongru-
ent trial, participants would focus their attention to the relevant
dimension, whereas they would loosen their control settings in
expectancy of a congruent trial. Such attentional ﬁltering leads
to fast responses to CC and II trial sequences, as expectan-
cies are conﬁrmed, but slow responses to CI and IC trials,
since preparation misﬁres. The repetition expectancy account
therefore predicts improved performance on congruency level
repetitions, and impaired performance on congruency level alter-
nations (i.e., a CSE). In contrast to the reactive, conﬂict-driven,
more or less automatically induced control adjustments pro-
posed by the conﬂict-monitoring theory, the repetition expectancy
stresses the role of proactive, anticipatory, voluntary control
processes.
Even though this theory quickly faded to the background
of the theoretical discussion following the publication of the
inﬂuential conﬂict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), a
couple of studies has recently attempted to experimentally iso-
late the relative contribution of expectancy-induced controlled
processes in a Stroop task, which yielded seemingly inconsistent
ﬁndings. Duthoo and Notebaert (2012), for example, created
experimental conditions that either favored or discouraged rep-
etition expectancies (by raising the amount of congruency level
repetitions or alternations, respectively) and looked for a transfer
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of these induced expectancies to a test phase in which congru-
ency level repetitions and alternations were equally likely. The
lack of a transfer effect suggested that participants failed to
exploit the global transitional probabilities and prepare accord-
ingly. Even in a context where congruency level alternations
were highly probable, performance beneﬁtted from scarce repe-
titions of congruent and incongruent trials. Jiménez and Méndez
(2013) manipulated transitional probabilities in a similar way
and also found that performance was not strongly affected by
expectancies. As they also measured participants’ expectancies in
separate blocks, the authors were able to show that even though
expectancies aligned with the transitional manipulation, Stroop
performance revealed a reaction time pattern in the opposite
direction. Duthoo et al. (2013a), however, set out to test the pre-
diction of the repetition expectancy account in a more direct
fashion, by explicitly asking participants whether they expected
an easy (congruent) or difﬁcult (incongruent) trial before they
responded to the Stroop stimulus. Over four experiments, results
conﬁrmed that participants displayed a repetition bias, expecting
congruency level repetitions above chance level. Moreover, only
when they predicted a congruency level repetition, a robust CSE
was found. They concluded that expectancy can exert an inﬂu-
ence on control above and beyond conﬂict-induced adjustments,
yet only when these expectancies are explicitly manipulated or
registered.
Another way to tease apart the relative contributions of reac-
tive and proactive inﬂuences to the CSE is to examine their time
course. Reactive, conﬂict-induced inﬂuences are assumed to be
short-lived, transient and thus subject to decay over time, whereas
proactive, anticipatory effects need some time for expectancies
to build up and are therefore theorized to grow stronger or at
least persist over time. By systematically varying the size of the
RSI (between 500 and 5000 ms) and inter-stimulus-interval (ISI;
between 500 and 7000 ms), Egner et al. (2010) demonstrated that
CSEs are observedwith small intervals (from500ms up to 2000ms
for RSI, and up to 3000 ms for ISI), yet completely disappear
at the longer intervals. According to the authors, an interpreta-
tion in terms of conﬂict adaptation processes with a fairly steep
decay function best ﬁtted the data. Based on these data, van den
Wildenberg et al. (2012) emphasized that adaptive cognitive con-
trol is inherently transient in nature. In a recent study, Duthoo
et al. (2013b) replicated the reduced CSE with increasing inter-
vals. However, they reasoned that expectancy-induced, proactive
control is more likely to affect the CSE in situations that pro-
mote such control mode more strongly. To this end, they applied
an RSI proportion manipulation that increased the probability of
the stimulus appearing at the longer RSI. Under these conditions,
they observed a reliable CSE for both short and long intervals, sug-
gesting that proactive control can prevent the CSE from decaying
rapidly.
Finally, a series of studies have manipulated expectancies more
directly, by investigating the impact of explicit cues on the CSE.
In their original paper reporting on the CSE, Gratton et al. (1992)
already showed that a CSE-like pattern also emerged when apply-
ing probabilistic cues, and suggested that the previous trial’s
congruency triggers a similar expectancy-driven attentional ﬁl-
tering mechanism as an explicit cue. This was later picked up by
Aarts and Roelofs (2011) in an fMRI setting. They applied a sim-
ilar probabilistic cueing procedure to a Stroop-like task to point
out that anticipating upcoming conﬂict (or lack of conﬂict) can
trigger similar sequential adjustments as experienced conﬂict (or
lack thereof) on the previous trial. Interestingly, they not only
replicated the CSE behaviorally, but also showed a similar sequen-
tial modulation of ACC activity that has been reported in previous
fMRI studies on conﬂict-induced adjustments (Kerns et al., 2004;
Kerns, 2006). The authors concluded that the ACC was involved in
strategic allocation of cognitive control. An EEG study by Correa
et al. (2009) also found that the ACC-mediated N2 deﬂection was
reduced following cues that signaled high conﬂict. They theorized
that anticipating conﬂict can speed up conﬂict detection and con-
ﬂict resolution. Taken together, the neurophysiological data thus
seem suggestive of a certain degree of neural overlap between the
control networks triggered by reactive and proactive signals. How-
ever, such proactive control adjustments will be limited to these
situations where expectancies are induced sufﬁciently strong or
explicitly cued, suggesting that repetition expectancy cannot be
the default interpretation of the CSE.
CONCLUSION, GUIDELINES, AND OUTLOOK
Since its ﬁrst report by Gratton et al. (1992), the CSE has boosted
an extensive body of research that aimed to uncover the under-
lying mechanisms of sequential modulation, in order to better
understand how people ﬂexibly adapt their behavior. Based on the
present literature review, some general conclusions can be drawn.
First and foremost, consensus can be reached that both top-down,
attentional adjustments and bottom-up, associative learning con-
tribute to the (size of) the CSE. Moreover, their contributions
seem to be largely dependent on the paradigm used to assess the
CSE. In two-value congruency tasks, the relative share of feature
integration will be substantial, if not complete (Mayr et al., 2003;
Hommel et al., 2004; Bugg, 2008). When administering congru-
ency tasks with more than two stimulus values, maintaining a
50% congruent/incongruent ratio introduces contingencies that
will exert a strong inﬂuence on sequential effects (Schmidt and
De Houwer, 2011; Mordkoff, 2012; Schmidt, 2013). Still, a series
of recent studies (Duthoo et al., in revision; Freitas and Clark,
2014; Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt and Weissman, 2014; Weiss-
man et al., 2014) has convincingly shown that in the absence of
feature repetition and contingency learning confounds, a CSE can
still emerge.
These studies allow distilling a set of guidelines on how to
assess such relatively “pure” CSEs. First, the standard two-value
congruency task has to be expanded to a four- (or more) value
congruency task. Second, all transitions involving feature repeti-
tions shouldpreferably be excludedbydesign, rather than excluded
post hoc or controlled for in the statistical analyses. Third, a 50%
congruent/incongruent ratio should be installed while keeping all
contingencies equal. One way of accomplishing this is to (a) cre-
ate a unique set of incongruent stimuli (e.g., “RED” in green in a
Stroop task, or “HHSHH” in a ﬂanker task), so that irrelevant
stimulus information is equally predictive of a congruent and
incongruent response, and (b) constrain randomselectionof stim-
uli to avoid feature overlap (Duthoo et al., in revision; Hengstler
et al., 2014). The major advantage here is that the classical conﬂict
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task remains intrinsically the same. Alternatively, four-value con-
gruency tasks can be split up into a pair of two-value congruency
taskswith separate stimulus-responsemappings that alternate on a
trial-by-trial basis (Schmidt and Weissman, 2014; Weissman et al.,
2014). As such, stimulus features never repeat over successive
intervals, and contingencies are kept equal across all trials. In a
four-color Stroop task, for example, stimuli can be divided into
two color pairs (and thus two sets of congruent and incongru-
ent trials) that are presented in alternating fashion (e.g., Jiménez
and Méndez, 2013; Weissman et al., 2014). Kim and Cho (2014)
applied a similar strategy to a color-ﬂanker task, but besides color
and response they also varied the stimulus dimension (e.g., vertical
vs. horizontal) on alternating trials. As a caveat, this manipulation
only produced reliable CSEs when participants responded to all
trials with one hand, and not when separate hands were used for
horizontal and vertical trials. According to the authors, the latter
led participants to no longer perceive the two tasks as involving a
common “response mode.” It has indeed been well documented
that increasing the difference between two tasks might hamper a
transfer of control settings (i.e., a CSE) across tasks (for a review,
see Braem et al., under revision).
Second, given that the evidence to date is indicative of a con-
tribution of both attentional adjustments and episodic memory
effects, the key theoretical question no longer pertains to which
mechanism accounts for the CSE, but rather how these mecha-
nisms interact and work together in producing adaptive behavior.
Even if a CSE is still found in the absence of memory confounds,
this does not at all imply that feature integration and/or con-
tingency learning have no share in bringing about the CSE in
designs that do not (fully) control for these. One promising avenue
for further research therefore lies in parametrically manipulat-
ing these inﬂuences within the same experiment to systematically
explore their contribution to the CSE. It could, for example, well
be that inserting contingencies in the design precludes the need
to engage in attentional control adjustments, as picking up and
adapting to these regularities would be advantageous and less
metabolically costly. In this light, Bugg (2014) has suggested that
attentional control adjustments would constitute a “last resort”
that participants will cling on when simpler learning mechanisms
fail to produce satisfactory outcomes. To shed more light on this
issue, one could also investigate whether participants will still pick
up and rely on associative learning after they performed a con-
gruency task in which such inﬂuences were controlled for, or
vice versa (see Abrahamse et al., 2013, for an example of order
effects on cognitive control strategies). The paradigms that were
described above might serve as an excellent tool for such research
endeavor.
Third, in almost all of the studies reviewed above, conﬂict-
induced cognitive control has been the default explanation in
situations where the CSE was found and confounding memory
effects were controlled for. Rather than conﬁrming the predic-
tions of the conﬂict-monitoring theory, such ﬁndings mainly
show that memory confounds cannot be the whole story. There-
fore, the ﬁeld is in need of observations that positively conﬁrm
speciﬁc predictions of the conﬂict-monitoring theory, and may
at the same time beneﬁt from a systematic exploration of other
cognitive control processes that could (additionally) drive the
CSE. In the present paper, we have evaluated one such addi-
tional source: repetition expectancy (Gratton et al., 1992). The
studies reviewed above suggest that strategic, expectancy-based
control adjustments only contribute to the CSE when they are
induced sufﬁciently strong, and therefore cannot be the default
explanation for the effect. Manipulating the proportion of congru-
ency level transitions appeared too subtle (Duthoo and Notebaert,
2012; Jiménez and Méndez, 2013), whereas applying an RSI
proportion manipulation (Duthoo et al., 2013a) and inserting
probabilistic cues (Gratton et al., 1992; Aarts and Roelofs, 2011)
or self-generated congruency predictions (Duthoo et al., 2013b)
proved successful in eliciting strategic control adjustments. Such
experimental manipulations provide an excellent research tool
to investigate how proactive, expectancy-based control processes
interact with reactive, conﬂict-induced control processes. A sec-
ond additional source to the CSE that has recently gathered
researchers’ attention is motivational in nature. More speciﬁcally,
Botvinick (2007) hypothesized that the experience of cognitive
conﬂict, or cognitive effort more generally, is inherently aver-
sive, and that this negative value could modulate or even drive
adaptations to conﬂict. A number of studies has indeed con-
ﬁrmed the ﬁrst assumption, namely that that conﬂict is perceived
as a negative event (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012a; Lynn et al.,
2012; Schouppe et al., 2012; Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013). How-
ever, whether it is this aversive nature (van Steenbergen et al.,
2009), or rather the (conﬂict) resolution thereof (Braem et al.,
2012; Schouppe et al., in press) that motivates adaptations to con-
ﬂict, remains an open question (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012b).
There is substantial room for further research to investigate
which of these components contribute to the CSE, and how they
interact.
Fourth, once conﬂict adaptation has been clearly identiﬁed and
demarcated, this would (re)activate some crucial challenges for
further research. For example, it should be explored which precise
mechanism(s) underlie such adaptation. These strategic adjust-
ments could entail the altering of perceptual attention to target
and/or distractor information (e.g., Egner and Hirsch, 2005b; Polk
et al., 2008), the facilitation or inhibition of responses to target
and/or distractor information (Ridderinkhof, 2002), or the gen-
eral strengthening of active associations (i.e., Hebbian learning;
Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009). Furthermore, such strate-
gic adjustments might also differ across (and depend on) speciﬁc
tasks used to assess the CSE (Egner, 2008), and should ideally be
thoroughly explored in unbiased designs (e.g., Weissman et al.,
2014). Another challenge would be to investigate how domain-
speciﬁc the mechanism(s) underlying conﬂict adaptation is/are.
Indeed, earlier studies already explored this potential for transfer
across different tasks, contexts and/or conﬂict types, spawning an
interesting, yet seemingly inconsistent set of results (for reviews,
see Braem et al., under revision; Egner, 2008). Although most
studies appear to demonstrate domain-speciﬁc CSEs, others claim
that adaptations to conﬂict can be domain-general. Therefore, it
remains to be investigated which general principle(s) this transfer
adheres to (Braem et al., under revision). To further test the gen-
eralizability of the conﬂict adaptation mechanisms, it should also
be explored if adaptation by recent conﬂict (i.e., the CSE) relies
on a similar mechanism as adaptation to frequent conﬂict, or not.
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The latter is often studied in proportion congruency tasks, where
speciﬁc proportions of (in)congruent trials modulate the congru-
ency effect – and thus presumably the amount of cognitive control.
Interestingly, the literature on this proportion congruency effect
sparked similar debates as for the CSE reviewed here. For example,
it has been discussed if the proportion congruency effect reﬂects
conﬂict adaptation or merely S-R contingency learning processes
(Abrahamse et al., 2013; Schmidt, 2013; see Bugg andCrump,2012
for a review). Similar to the CSE, the empirical evidence seems to
suggest that contingency learning cannot account for all obser-
vations – and thus that conﬂict adaptation seems to be involved.
However, it is still strongly debated if the CSE and the propor-
tion congruency effect involve the same underlying mechanism
(Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009) or not (Funes et al., 2010a,b;
Torres-Quesada et al., 2013; Wühr et al., in press). These types of
questions should be (re)considered using the appropriate designs
for assessing CSEs.
Finally, the neurophysiological data on the CSE to date do seem
to nicely conﬁrm predictions of the conﬂict monitoring account:
Both imaging results (Kerns et al., 2004; Egner andHirsch,2005a,b;
Kerns, 2006; but see Grinband et al., 2011), EEG data (Stürmer
et al., 2002; Larson et al., 2009, 2012; Clayson and Larson, 2011,
2012; Forster et al., 2011; Donohue et al., 2012; but see Wendt
et al., 2007), as well as an rTMS (Stürmer et al., 2007) and human
single neuron recordings and lesion study (Sheth et al., 2012) are
consistent with the proposed ACC-driven conﬂict detection and
DLPFC-implemented conﬂict resolution control processes. How-
ever, all of these studies have employed congruency tasks that were
critically contaminated with feature integration and/or contin-
gency learning confounds. Even though no study has yet set out to
directly test the neural correlates of these learning accounts, it may
well be the case that medial and dorsolateral prefrontral cortex
are also critically involved in such associative learning (Grand-
jean et al., 2013; Schmidt, 2013). The unbiased designs discussed
above might therefore be an excellent starting point for further
neurophysiological studies that want to elucidate the respective
roles of the ACC and DLPFC in producing a CSE. A ﬁnal chal-
lenge for future research then lies in integrating conﬂict-control
and associative learning mechanisms, as well as their interactions
and neural substrates into overarching models of cognitive control
(see, e.g., Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009).
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